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dom of speech in a company-owned town, 5 prevention of Negro
voting in a primary election, 6 orders of a private park guard acting
under the color of his authority as a deputy sheriff,1 and the statements of city officials that they would not permit negroes to seek
desegregation,' have all been held to constitute "state action."
In Evans v. Abney, the Court begins to delineate those acts of state
agencies that are insufficient to constitute state involvement in racial
discrimination. The decision enumerates two activities that lie beyond
the uncertain line that defines the limits of "state action." A state court
may enforce a neutral principle of trust law even if the result is to
aid a private testator's scheme of discrimination. The existence of a
state statute permitting racially restrictive trusts is not sufficient "state
action" to invalidate a trust made under the authority of such a
statute.' 9
To the extent that predictability in the law is desirable, the decision
will benefit society. Those seeking to discriminate against racial groups
may be encouraged, however, to push their activities to the limit of
what is now a more clearly defined area of law.
FRED K. MORRISON

Constitutional Law-THE IN-SERVICE CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTOR.

Goguen v. Clifford, 304 F. Supp. 958 (D. N.J. 1969).
After his induction into the United States Army, Private Philip W.
Goguen applied for discharge on the basis that he had become a conscientious objector to all war.' Although his sincerity was unquestioned,
Goguen's commanding officer denied the application on the grounds
that his request was based on "essentially political, sociological or philosophical views, or a merely personal moral code" and not upon religious
15. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
16. Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944).

17. Griffin v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 130 (1964).
18. Peterson v. Greenville, 373 U.S. 244 (1963).
19. But cf. Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967) (article of state constitution
prohibiting state from denying right of any person to decline to sell his real property
to such person as he in his absolute discretion chooses would involve the state in
unconstitutional racial discrimination).
1. ARMY REGULATION 635-20 (May 1, 1967) provides for a procedure whereby request for discharge may be made on grounds of conscientious objection to war which
arose after admission to the military. The regulation was implemented in accordance
with DEPARTMENT oF DEFENSE DIRECrIVE 1300.6 (revised May 1968).
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grounds.2 After he was denied discharge, Goguen petitioned the Digtrict Court of the District of New Jersey for a writ of habeas corpus.3
The Court held, inter alia,4 that the standard of "religious training
or belief," set out in the Military Selective Service Act of 1967, is
violative of constitutional proscription against the establishment of religion and due process.6 Accordingly the Court granted the petitioner a
writ of habeas corpus.
Congress has historically required that for one to obtain conscientious
objector status his opposition to war must be based on "religious train2. The regulation incorporates the same standards as those used by the SelectiveService System in passing on pre-induction requests for conscientious objection status..
See DEPARTMENT oF DEFENSE DYm-Er
1300.6, IV3.3.b. This implements The MilitarySelective Service Act of 1967, § 7, 81 Star. 104, amending 50 U.S.C. APP. § 456(j)
(1964) (codified at 50 U.S.C. APP. § 456(j) (Supp. IV, 1969)):
Nothing contained in this title . . .shall be construed to require any
person to be subject to combatant training and service in the armed
forces of the United States who, by reason of religious training and belief,
is conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any form. As used
in this subsection, the term "religious training and belief" does not include essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views, or a merely
personal moral code.
3. Goguen v. Clifford, 304 F. Supp. 958 (D. NJ. 1969). See also Koster v. Shar,
303 F. Supp. 837 (E.D. Pa. 1969) which is an identical case.
4. The court also held that federal district courts have reviewing powers even in
the absence of the petitioner exhausting his remedies through military channels. For
the jurisdictional question see Hammond v. Lenfest, 398 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1968);
Brown v. McNamara, 387 F.2d 150 (3rd Cir. 1967), cert. denied sub non. Brown v.
Clifford, 390 U.S. 1005 (1968); United States ex rel. Brooks v. Clifford, 409 F.2d 700
(4th Cir. 1969); Crane v. Hendrick, 284 F. Supp. 250 (N.D. Cal. 1968); Gann v. Wilson,
289 F. Supp. 191 (N.D. Cal. 1968); Cooper v. Barker, 291 F. Supp. 952 (D.Md. 1968);
Benway v. Barnhill, 300 F. Supp. 483 (D. R.I. 1969). See also 43 N.Y.U. L. REv.
988 (1968); 37 GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 589 (1969).
5. See note 3 supra.
6. 304 F. Supp. at 962:
For while one is free to practice his religion under the First Amendment,
he who does not is equally free in the exercise of his election not to do
so, and his Constitutional rights are not diminished thereby. It was
declared in Epperson v. Arkansas, [393 US. 97, 103-107 (1968)], that
the First Amendment mandates government neutrality between . . .
religion and non-religion. The court observed at page 104, . . . quoting
from Watson v. Jones, [13 Wall. 679, 728 (1872)], "The law knows no
heresy, and is committed to the support of no dogma, the establishment
of no sect."
U. S. CONSr. amend. I: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof ...."
U. S. CoNsr. amend. V: "No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law......
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ing and belief." 7 Due to the courts' varying interpretations of the
,existing law," Congress incorporated a definition of "religious training
and belief" in the Selective Service Act of 1948 by equating it with "an
individual's belief in a relation to a Supreme Being involving duties
superior to those arising from any human relation." 9 Subsequently,
however, in United States v. Seeger,"° the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit held that this "Supreme Being" requirement violated the
due process clause of the Fifth Amendment and accordingly reversed
Seeger's conviction for refusing to submit to induction into the armed
services." In affirming the Second Circuit,12 the United States Supreme
Court avoided the constitutional issue by holding that Seeger's conscientious objection was "religious" within that definition in the 1948
7. See Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, ch. 720, S (g), 54 Stat. 889 (1940).
The conscientious objector exemption stated that no person would be subject to
combatant training or service "who, by reason of religious training and belief is
conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any form."
The Selective Draft Act of 1917, ch. 15, § 4, 40 Stat. 78 limited conscientious
objector exemptions to members "of any well-recognized religious sect or organization . . .whose existing creed or principals forbid its members to participate in war
in any form .

. . ."

For an interpretation of the 1917 Act see Hamilton v. Regents of

the Univ. of Cal., 293 U.S. 245, 265 (1934) (Cardozo, J.
military service had never been thought to constitute an
exercise of religion. Id. at 266.
[A] different doctrine would carry us to lengths
been dreamed of. The conscientious objector, if his

concurring). He felt that
interference with the free
that have never yet
liberties were to be

thus extended, might refuse to contribute taxes in furtherance . . . of

any other end condemned by his conscience as irreligious or immoral.
The right to private judgment has never yet been so exalted above the
powers and the compulsion of the agencies of government.
Id. at 268.
8. See Phillips v. Downer, 135 F.2d 521 (2d Cir. 1943) where the court granted
conscientious objector status to one who objected to war on basic ethical and humanitarian grounds. Accord, Brandon v. Downer, 139 F.2d 761 (2d Cir. 1944); Reel v. Badt,
141 F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1944); United States v. Kauten, 133 F.2d 703 (2d Cir. 1943)
(dictum); Clark v. United States, 236 F.2d 13 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 882
(1956); George v. United States, 196 F.2d 445 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 843
(1952); Cf. Berman v. United States, 156 F.2d 377 (9th Cir. 1946).
9. Selective Service Act of 1948, ch. 625, § 6(j), 62 Stat. 612-13.
10. 326 F.2d 846 (2d Cir. 1964).
11. Seeger applied for a conscientious objector draft classification but was refused.
Subsequently, he was drafted at which time he refused to be inducted into the Army.
He was convicted of refusing to be inducted in United States v. Seeger, 216 F. Supp.
516 (S.D. N.Y. 1963). Seeger did not believe in a Supreme Being but the court found
on appeal that he was sincere in his opposition to war from a "practical . . . [and]
moral standpoint." 326 F.2d at 848.
12. United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
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Act.' 3 In response to the Seeger14 decision, Congress deleted the "Supreme Being" clause from the 1948 Act.15 Lower Federal Courts, however, have consistently viewed the Seeger test as still applicable. 6 It
was not until United States v. Sisson,17 however, that a court ruled that
the Military Selective Service Act of 1967 was unconstitutional when
applied to inductees.
The District Court in Goguenl' relied upon Sissone9 in extending the
constitutional test to those who sought discharge from military service.
Sisson held, inter alia,2 1 that to excuse from military service the
13. The court concluded that religious training and belief included
all sincere religious beliefs which are based upon a power or being, or
upon a faith, to which all else is subordinate or upon which all else is
ultimately dependent. The test might be stated in these words: A sincere
and meaningful belief which occupies in the life of its possessor a place
parallel to that filled by the God of those admittedly qualifying for the
exemption.
Id. at 176.
For a critique of the test see: Brodie & Sutherland, Conscience, the Constitution and'
the Supreme Court: The Riddle of United States v. Seeger, 1966 Wis. L. REv. 306,
319 (1966):
It is, of course, a sound principle that the court should avoid deciding
constitutional issues if the case can be disposed of on a question of
statutory interpretation. But the question remains whether constitutional
issues should be avoided at the cost of an ambiguous and strained construction ....
14. United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
15. Compare The Military Selective Service Act of 1967, § 7, 81 Stat. 104 (codified
at 50 U.S.C. APp. § 456(j) (Supp. IV, 1969)) qdth 50 U.S.C. APP. .§ 456(j) (1964).
16. Benway v. Barnhill, 300 F. Supp. 483, 486 (D. R.I. 1969); United States ex rel.
Brooks v. Clifford, 296 F. Supp. 716, 724-25 (D. S.C. 1969) (dictum); United States v.
Shacter, 293 F. Supp. 1057, 1060-64 (D. Md. 1968); United States v. St. Clair, 293
F. Supp. 337, 442 (ED. N.Y. 1968).
17. 297 F. Supp. 902 (D. Mass. 1969).
18. Goguen v. Clifford, 304 F. Supp. 958 (D. NJ. 1969).
19. Goguen v. Clifford, 304 F. Supp. 958, 962 (D. N.J. 1969) quoting from Koster v.
Sharp, 303 F. Supp. 837, 845 (E.D. Pa. 1969) quoting from United States v. Sisson,
297 F. Supp. 902, 911 (1969):
Under the Everson test, [Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S.
1 (1947)] a regulation which makes exemption from military service
dependent upon the applicant's religious belief is, on its face, defective.
Further, a standard which exempts a religiously motivated conscientious
objector from military service and denies the same relief to a person whose
beliefs are just as sincere but which are not motivated by any relationship
to any religion is constitutionally defective under the Fifth Amendments
guarantee of due process of law. We concur in Judge Wyzanski's assessment that '... . it is difficult to imagine any ground for a statutory distinction except religious prejudice.'
20. It is not clear as to whether Sisson was a conscientious objector to a single war-
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"religious" conscientious objector while denying it to an individual who
based his objection to war upon a personal moral code violated the first
:amendment to the United States Constitution. 21 At least one court,
however, has not followed the Sisson lead,2 and a number of courts, in
,deciding cases where the defendants' beliefs were comparable to Go:guen's,23 have avoided the constitutional question by classifying the
defendants' objection as "religious." 24

If Goguen reaches the Supreme Court, it is probable that such a
decision would be a delayed duplicate of Seeger, affirming the decision
but avoiding the constitutional question by holding that Goguen's basis
for conscientious objection to war is within the interpretation of "religious training and belief."

Accordingly, the constitutionality of the

Military Selective Service Act will remain in doubt until the Supreme
Court is confronted with a petitioner whose conscientious objection can

not, by any interpretation, be classified "religious."

25
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or to war in general. The court recognized that selective objection "might reflect a
more discriminate study of the problem, a more sensitive conscience, and a deeper
spiritual understanding . .

."

than shown by those opposed to war "in any form." 297

F. Supp. at 908. Federal law exempts only those who are opposed to "war in any
form." 50 U.S.C. App. 456(j) (Supp. IV. 1969). See generally Magill, Selective
Conscientious Objection: Divine Will and Legislative Grace, 54 VA. L. Rav. 1355
(1968).
21. United States v. Sisson, 297 F. Supp. 902, 911 (D. Mass. 1969).
22. United States v. Neamand, 302 F. Supp. 1296, 1306 (M.D. Pa. 1969):
[I] decline the opportunity to follow the lead of United States v.
Sisson . . . and hold that Section 6(j) does not violate either the First
Amendment or the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
Accordingly, the defendant was found guilty of refusing to submit to induction.
23. Goguen was a Roman Catholic and his reasons for conscientious objection to war
could have easily been included within the Seeger definition. See 304 F. Supp. at 959.
24. See Fleming v. United States, 344 F.2d 912 (10th Cir. 1965); United States ex rel.
Brooks v. Clifford, 409 F.2d 700 (4th Cir. 1969); United States v. St. Clair, 293 F. Supp.
337 (E.D. N.Y. 1968); United States v. Shacter, 293 F. Supp. 1057 (D. Md. 1968)
(Shacter was a professed atheist but was still granted conscientious objector status);
Benway v. Barnhill, 300 F. Supp. 483 (D. R.I. 1969). In United States ex rel. Healy v.
Beatty, 300 F. Supp. 843, 848 (1969) the court stated:
It is difficult to draw a line between religious beliefs and those merely
philosophical or political. A person's own moral code may be that
and nothing more but it may, at the same time, be derived from
religious training and belief.
25. It has been argued that the court's construction in Seeger protected the
conscientious objector exemption from a constitutional crossfire; Congress might decide
to abolish the exemption if the Court held nonbelievers as well as believers entitled
to exemption. The Supreme Court, 1964 Term, 79 HARV. L. RFv. 56, 115 (1965).

